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ABSTRACT
This article presents Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic of the productive
imagination as a methodological tool for understanding the
innovative social function of texts that in exceeding their semantic
meaning, iconically augment reality. Through the reasoning of
Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno’s unpublished text, Rastafarian: The
Earth’s Most Strangest Man, and the religious and biblical
signification from the music of his most famous postulate, Bob
Marley, this article applies Paul Ricœur’s schema of the religious
productive imagination to conceptualize the metaphoric transfer
from text to life of verbal and iconic images of Rastafari’s
hermeneutic of word, sound and power. This transformation is
accomplished through what Ricœur terms the phenomenology of
the iconic augmentation of reality. Understanding this semantic
innovation is critical to understanding the capacity of the religious
imagination to transform reality as a proclamation of hope in the
midst of despair.
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Under the sign of this ultimate incognito of forgiveness, an echo can be heard of the word of
wisdom uttered in the Song of Songs: “Love is as strong as death.” The reserve of forgetting, I
would then say, is as strong as the forgetting through effacement.1
If you know your history,
Then you would know where you coming from,
Then you wouldn’t have to ask me,
Who the ’eck do I think I am.2
Introduction3
For many, Rastafari conjures images of ganja smoking, dreadlocks, Bob Marley, and
reggae rhythms. While there is some truth in these images, for many, this is as far as
their journey with Rastafari goes. Rastafari’s importance to Jamaica and the world has
been acknowledged by scholars such as Rex Nettleford, who argues “[Rastafari is] one
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of the most significant phenomena to emerge out of the modern history and sociology of
Plantation America, that New World culturesphere of which Jamaica and the Caribbean
are a part.”4 Theologian Jürgen Moltmann identifies Rastafari as “one of the most inter-
esting modern forms of expression of the ‘religion of the oppressed’.” In developing their
“own underground culture, a counter-culture to the culture of the white rulers,” Rastafari
has transformed the dominant language of oppression into a counter language of liber-
ation and converted the dominant religious symbols of Babylon into a subversive religion
of Zion.5 Babylon and Zion are iconic images that reveal through the power of the religious
productive imagination an iconically augmented reality by proclaiming hope through the
metaphorization of meaning in the text to life in front of the text.
This article presents Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination as a
methodological tool for understanding the innovative social function of texts that in
exceeding their semantic meaning, iconically, augment reality. Through the reasoning
of Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno’s unpublished text, Rastafarian: The Earth’s Most
Strangest Man, and the religious and biblical signification from the music of his most
famous postulate, Bob Marley, this article applies Paul Ricœur’s schema of the religious
productive imagination to conceptualize the metaphoric transfer from text to life of
verbal and iconic images of Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound and power. This trans-
formation is accomplished through what Ricœur terms the phenomenology of the iconic
augmentation of reality. Understanding this semantic innovation is critical to apprehend-
ing the capacity of the religious imagination to transform reality as a proclamation of hope
in the midst of despair. In this article, these concepts will be illustrated through a joint
analysis of Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno’s The Earth’s Most Strangest Man and two
of Rastafari reggae performer Bob Marley’s songs, ‘Johnny Was’ and ‘No Woman, No
Cry’.
The Productive Imagination
While never systematized in his published works, in the forthcoming publication of the
Imagination Lectures, Ricœur is explicit in his presentation of the role of the productive
imagination in the historical dialectic of alienating distanciation.6 Ricœur’s Imagination
Lectures, delivered at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1975, provide the most com-
plete presentation of the centrality of the productive imagination in Ricoeur’s thought.
George H. Taylor, who transcribed these texts for a forthcoming volume, argues that
these lectures came at a critical cusp in Ricoeur’s career…At this central juncture, Ricoeur is
crystallizing his thoughts on poetics (and so fulfilling in a recast way the third part of his Phil-
osophy of Will). Imagination lies at the heart of his thinking at this time.7
The productive imagination enables us to be receptive to the effects of history, to receive
traditions, to know where we are coming from, where we are, and where we are going.
Ricœur’s hermeneutic of the productive imagination interprets “cultural heritages received
4Quoted in Velma Velma, Dread Talk, 3.
5Moltmann, Experiences in Theology, 199.
6I am indebted to Dr George H. Taylor who provided me with the unpublished transcripts of Ricœur’s Imagination Lectures.
Each chapter of the transcription’s pagination restarts with the numeral <1>. For the sake of clarity, page references to
the transcribed lectures are provided with the chapter number followed by the page number.
7Taylor “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 93.
BLACK THEOLOGY 157
from the past and the interest in the futuristic projections of a liberated humanity.”8 The
imagination sees, and more importantly, knows, a world different from the one we experi-
ence. What is critical to understanding this capacity to imagine an alternative world is the
movement from the reproductive to the productive imagination. This movement shifts the
focus of philosophical reﬂection from the dominant approach rooted in the interiorized
image to Ricœur’s alternative productive imagination rooted in the framework of the
semantic and linguistic orientation developed in his theory of metaphor.
Ricœur’s reflection on the productive imagination begins with the question, “What is it
to have an image?” He notes that a philosophical investigation into this question is
immediately confronted by “a series of obstacles, paradoxes, and stumbling blocks that
perhaps explain the relative eclipse of the problem of imagination in contemporary
philosophy.”9
Chief among these obstacles is the empiricist theory of knowledge that privileges repro-
ductive imagination’s focus on the interiority of the image. Ricœur’s main concern is that
the term “image” is generally understood as “a mental, private, and unobservable entity.”10
Ricœur rejects the traditional reproductive model of image “as first and foremost a ‘scene’
unfolding in some mental ‘theatre’ before the gaze of an internal ‘spectator,’” relegating
image to the realm of the interior mental representation of perception, which is inaccess-
ible to outside observation.11 Quoting Ricœur, who cites Kant, George Taylor notes,
“Imagination is not at all an alternative to perception [as it is in Hume] but [is] an ingredient
of perception. It’s encapsulated within the framework of perception.” Elsewhere in these
materials Ricœur argues that “[w]e can no longer oppose… imagining to seeing if seeing
is itself a way of imagining, interpreting, or thinking.”12
The false opposition between imagination and perception is the blind alley down which
philosophical reﬂections on imagination have stumbled.
In his 1975 Imagination Lectures, Ricœur identifies three inadequacies in philosophical
theories of the reproductive imagination: (1) the reliance on an already existing referent;
(2) the marginalization of the appearance of reality; and (3) the isolation of the image from
a broader framework.13 Theories of the reproductive imagination understand the image as
referring to something that is absent, and is therefore always a derivative and never orig-
inal. This model of the original as a copy that is, at best, a derivative of reality, and at worst,
marginal, or an escape from reality, produces nothingness.14 The nothingness of absence,
Ricœur reasons, annihilates the object imagined, replacing it with a quasi-object or a
pretend object. In either case, the imagined is unreal, “the negativity of nothingness, along-
side the non-existence of the fictional object.”15 Nothingness is a fundamental trait of the
object. It is the inaccuracy of the construction of the concept of nothingness that limits
theories of the imagination to the reproductive. Ricœur’s rejection of this nihilistic under-
standing of nothing in favour of a formation of nothing as the utopic Epochě of/from
8Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 100.
9Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 168.
10Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 169.
11Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 171.
12Taylor, “The Phenomological Contributions of Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 15.
13Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 15:1–8.
14Taylor, “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 96.
15Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 15:2.
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reality liberates the productive imagination from the referent of the image or the original,
giving the productive imagination the capacity to imagine something truly new. Ricœur
provisionally terms this relationship the productive referent.
The productive referent provides new insights into reality by creating its own original.
“The image,” Ricœur argues,
already has a reference that is not its own reference but the reference of the perception, the
possible perception of the thing, what we call the original of the copy, the original of the
photograph, even the original of a painting. But we shall see that in painting we have
more than a copy; we have a certain creation of its own original.16
The productive imagination does not create without a referent so much as, to use Ricœur’s
language, the referent of the productive imagination is produced by the imagination.
Ricœur contrasts the productive referent’s relation to image without an original against
that of the reproductive referent’s relation to an image that already has an original. Such an
image can only try to approximate that which it reproduces, which is not the original
object’s reference, but a reference of the possible perception of the object.17 A painting,
for instance, is not only a copy of an original; it is also a creation of its own origin.
Within the work of a painting, framed, is the creation of a reality that is more than the
image reproduced. Ricœur notes that early photography was developed for the purpose
of preserving fleeting memory and fleeting images of reality. As such, it was reproductive.
Painting had to distance itself from photography because it could no longer re-present
reality as photography could. Impressionism emerged to overcome photography by
“creating a new alphabet of colors capable of capturing the transient and the fleeting
with the magic of hidden correspondences. Once more, reality was remade with an
emphasis on atmospheric values and light appearances.”18
Merleau-Ponty makes a similar observation in his essay, “Cézanne’s Doubt”, arguing
that the result of impressionists’ attempt to
capture, in the painting, the very way in which objects strike our eyes and attack our senses
…was that the canvas—which no longer corresponded point by point to nature, restored a
general truth of the impression through the action of the separate parts upon one another.19
The emphasis on atmospheric values and light appearances, Merleau-Ponty argues,
resulted in the submersion of the object being depicted, “causing it to lose its proper
weight.” Cézanne responds to this submersion of the object with “The use of warm
colors and black that shows Cézanne wants to represent the object, to ﬁnd it again
behind the atmosphere…with a modulation of colors which stays close to the object’s
form and to the light it receives.”20
Ricœur contrasts this marginalization of reality by the reproductive imagination with
the iconic augmentation of reality by the productive imagination. From Ricœur’s perspec-
tive, the object being depicted is in the frame of the painting, on the canvas, not the apple
on the table that has long since rotted away. Merleau-Ponty’s perception of the submer-
sion of the proper weight of the object being depicted is suggestive of the reproductive
16Ibid., 15:3.
17Ibid., 15:4.
18Ibid., 17:13.
19Merleau-Ponty, The Merleau-Ponty Reader, 71.
20Merleau-Ponty, The Merleau-Ponty Reader, 72.
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imagination’s marginalization of reality. That said, Cézanne’s attempt to restore the weight
of the object being depicted, despite the apparent intent to replicate reality, illustrates “a
reference that is not its own reference but the reference of the perception, the possible per-
ception of the thing.”21 Merleau-Ponty notes:
Cézanne remarked that “as soon as you paint you draw,” by which he meant that neither in
the world as we perceive it nor in the picture which is an expression of that world can we
distinguish between, on the one hand, the outline or shape of the object and, on the other
hand the point where colours end or fade…Cézanne strives to give birth to the outline
and shape of objects in the same way that nature does when we look at them: through the
arrangement of colours. This is why, when he paints an apple and renders its coloured
texture with unfailing patience, it ends up swelling and bursting free from the confines of
the well-behaved draughtsmanship.22
In “Practical Theology and the Emergence of the New Self,” John van den Hengel
observes that Ricœur’s entire philosophical project attempts to go beyond Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception.23 Going beyond perception, Ricœur insists, ulti-
mately requires us to both understand and accept that we must question our modern
concept of reality. Specifically, Ricœur advocates overcoming modernity’s fixation on
the empirical verification of reality, viewing reality only as that which can conform or
falsify empirical statements. In Ricœur’s words,
We have to question not only the tradition of the image as a shadow of something but also a
frozen concept of reality. We tend to call reality what we know already as reality, what has
been agreed on as reality.24
Fiction shocks our concept of reality, drawing what is generally accepted into question.
Rather than accepting the repeated claim of literary critiques that poetry is only emotional
and therefore can only display connotations without any truth claims, Ricœur favours
Nelson Goodman’s approach where “reality is made by language and remade by metapho-
rical discourse.”25 Leaving the question of Goodman’s nominalism aside, Ricœur con-
cludes that the construction of reality is never ending and is “as much construed by
painting and poetry as by sense, but not for the same purpose.”26
Poetry and art do not represent internalized thought, but rather, externalized creative
imaginings. The need to go beyond the limits of interiorized perception leads Ricœur to
search for explanations of perception that are less reliant on the intuitive, reproductive
imagination of Merleau-Ponty’s world of perception. The referent apple demonstrates
the paradox of the non-referential referent, as the apple on the canvas “swells and
bursts free from the confines of the well-behaved draughtsmanship.” Ricœur explains
this paradox in the context of fiction, affirming that:
Only when we start from the fiction, which seems to be non-referential in the sense that it has
no object, that a new kind of reference may be opened thanks to the absence of a real referent,
of an original. Whereas the reproductive image is marginal as regards reality, it’s the function
of productive imagination—of the fictional—to open and change reality. Productive
21Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 15:9.
22Merleau-Ponty, The Merleau-Ponty Reader, 51–52.
23van den Hengel, “Practical Theology and the Emergence of the New Self.”
24Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 17:15.
25Ibid., 17:8.
26Ibid., 17:8.
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imagination may enlarge and even produce new worldviews, new ways of looking at things. It
may finally change even our way of being in the world.27
Iconic Augmentation
The image conceived as absence (as the submerged referent that has lost its proper weight)
is surpassed by the image that has the capacity to change reality, to burst free from the
confines of the work. Ricœur terms this the iconic augmentation of reality. Borrowing
from literary critic, François Dagognet, Ricœur states that “through the image we may
have an augmentation of reality and not merely a shadow within ourselves. To the
extent that the image is not the copy of something exterior without an original, then it
adds to reality.”28 The terms “iconic” and “augmentation”, Taylor notes, bind Ricœur’s
phenomenology to the sense (iconic) and reference (augmentation) of reality.29 In this
respect, Ricœur’s understanding of the relation between “iconic” and “augmentation” is
similar to the relation between the world of the text (icon) and the world in front of
the text (augmentation) which the text seeks to represent.
Taylor identifies three elements of iconic augmentation highlighted by Ricœur: (1) the
externalization of creativity that increases reality; (2) the increase or expansion of reality is
linked to an artistic alphabet; (3) the greater the deviation from ordinary vision and
language, the greater the increase to reality.
In the first instance, the externalization of creativity, iconic augmentation, uses the
medium of the creator, such as oil, paint and canvas, musical genre, or lyrical structure,
as an external alternative to the mental image. The expanded reality of this alternative
to the mental image, regardless of the chosen medium, is linked to an artistic alphabet
that abbreviates and condenses the traits of reality.30
This process creates the conditions for increasing the generative power of the iconic.
Using Dagognet’s example of the invention of Dutch painting and the language of the
laws of thermodynamics, Ricœur argues that the negative entropy of iconic augmentation
resists the elimination of differentiations and tension of the entropic trend, thus allowing
for the expansion and enlargement of our perception of reality.31 This increase in genera-
tive power is followed by the third element of iconic augmentation. The greater this nega-
tive entropy is from our ordinary vision and language, to quote Taylor, “the closer it comes
to the core of reality that is no longer the world of manipulable objects and the more we
experience the relation to reality before its objectification.”32
These elements of iconic augmentation have ontological consequences as they expand
our horizon of understanding by opening new ways of looking at reality. In Ricœur’s
words, “If we start with an image without an original, then we may discover a kind of
second ontology… the ontology displayed by the image itself, because it has no orig-
inal.”33 In being freed from the governance of the original, fiction is able to depict and ulti-
mately re-configure reality.
27Ibid., 15:4.
28Ibid., 16:4.
29Taylor, “The Phenomological Contributions of Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 15.
30Ibid., 24.
31Ibid.
32Ibid., 25.
33Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 16:1.
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The distinction Ricœur makes between a productive and reproductive conceptualiz-
ation of the image is strikingly similar to the distinction made between religious idols
and icons. “Beyond their artistic differences,” Maximos Constas reminds us, “the idol
and the icon indicate two modes of being, variations in the mode of visibility, which
give shape to variations in the mode of divine apprehension.”34 Constas, like Ricœur, chal-
lenges the Platonic disregard for the image, noting that by attempting to represent a
perfect image of the divine (reproductive), the idol reduces the divine to the human
gaze. Or as Constas explains,
The idol delights in physical existence, in the delight we experience in vision itself, and its
highest aim is to make that delight perceptible to us. In concretizing the splendor of the
visible, the idol dazzles and so arrests our vision, confining it within a closed, selfreferential
system, allowing us to see nothing outside itself. The idol consequently reduces the divine to
the measure of the human gaze, arresting the movement of ascent precisely at the threshold
of the invisible.35
“The icon”, Constas continues, “aims to free vision by confronting it with the invisible,
proposing to it that the boundaries of the possible are wider than they seem.”36 The
icon confronts the limits of representation by using iconic images to overthrow the
power of idolatrous images. In this way, icons “disrupt habituated ways of seeing, to
subvert the hegemony of naturalistic representation, and so summon the eye to a new
mode of vision, by opening it up to an infinite depth.”37 Or as Ricœur puts it, “Each
time the new connection at which we are aiming our thought grasps what the icon
describes or depicts…We iconize, if we may say, the new relations between things that
we are discovering.”38
It is through this act of iconizing, Ricœur maintains, that reality is augmented. Ricœur
insists that through iconic augmentation, there is an inextricable interrelation between
seeing and saying, and vision and language.
Ricœur does not conceive of a free-for-all augmentation of reality by every exteriorized
thought any individual might have. Rather, he restricts his analysis of the productive
imagination to techne, or work. A work is both an action (the work of painting or
writing) and an object (a work of art/fiction). In either case, Ricœur argues that work
entails an intentional framing of the productive referent. In the case of the former, com-
paring painting to poetry, Ricœur declares,
A painting must be a work or a frame while a poem is historically a kind of language game
that has its own dimensions. Construing a hypothesis or a scientific model involves elabor-
ating its project, its strategy for action in order to make a decision. There must always be
some new project encompassing the production of imagination.39
The boundwork of poetic language and the development of odd predicates in themetaphoric
statement exemplify the productive imagination’s iconic augmentationof reality. For Ricœur,
the power and creativity of this iconic augmentation are in the dialectic between the verbal
34Constas, The Art of Seeing, 292.
35 Ibid., 292.
36Ibid., 292.
37Ibid., 292.
38See note 12.
39Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 15:6.
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and the visual. Seeing and image, Ricœur insists, are ingredients of perception encapsulated in
the framework of perception. Or, as Ricœur argues, “[w]e can no longer oppose… imagining
to seeing, if seeing is itself a way of imagining, interpreting, or thinking.”40
Semantic Model of the Productive Imagination
Ricœur proposes a semantic model of the productive imagination where, in conjunction
with a metaphoric use of language, the verbal and the visual are placed in a dialectical situ-
ation. “It’s only when language is creative,” Ricœur affirms, “that imagination is crea-
tive.”41 Liberating imagination from the interiority of the mind through a semantic
approach releases the creative potential of the productive imagination. A modern
theory of metaphor that stresses opening up a world creates new outlooks on the
problem of the imagination. Or as Ricœur pronounces,
We are prepared to inquire into the power of imagination, no longer as the faculty of deriving
“images” from sensory experiences, but as the capacity to let new worlds build our self-under-
standing. This power would not be conveyed by emerging images but by emerging meanings
in our language. Imagination, then, should be treated as a dimension of language. In that way,
a new link would appear between imagination and metaphor.42
This new link is the “apperception of the sudden glimpse, of a new predicative pertinence,
namely, a way of constructing pertinence in impertinence.”43 A semantic model of pro-
ductive imagination opens a horizon of hope where the possible is made probable.
Richard Kearney argues,
The metaphors, symbols, or narratives produced by imagination all provide us with “imagi-
native variations” of the world, thereby offering us the freedom to conceive of the world in
other ways and to undertake forms of action, which might lead to its transformation. Seman-
tic innovation can thus point towards social transformation. The possible worlds of imagin-
ation can be made real by actions.44
The function of the productive imagination is most developed through Ricœur’s analysis
of a modern theory of metaphor found in a number of his published and unpublished
works, including the soon to be published The Rule of Metaphor. In the earlier texts,
“Metaphor and the Main Problem with Hermeneutics” and “Biblical Hermeneutics,”
Ricœur develops the link between imagination and metaphor by reorienting the rhetorical
theory of metaphor45 as at the level of semiotics and the substitution of the word, which is
a modern semantic theory of metaphor in tension.46
40Taylor, “Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” 94.
41Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics,” 110.
42Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics,” 110.
43Ricoeur, From Text to Action, 173.
44Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, 42.
45A rhetorical theory of metaphor recognizes metaphors as figures of discourse concerned with naming, either by stylistic
choice or to fill a lexical gap. Metaphors portray a divergence between the literal or proper sense of a word, and a fig-
urative or improper sense of the word. The resemblance between the figurative and the literal functions as the grounds
for substituting the figurative sense of a word by borrowing from the literal sense of a word. Since we are operating at the
level of words, the interpretation of metaphor is reduced to a semiotic interpretation, where the substitution of sense is
not a semantic innovation at the level of the meaning of the sentence. Since there is no semantic innovation, metaphor
gives no information about reality, and is therefore an ornamental addition to discourse, serving an emotive rather than
rational function.
46Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor. See also Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics,” 95–110. See also
Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 77.
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A modern semantic theory of metaphor concerns itself with the semantics of the
encompassing sentence before the semiotics of the word. Metaphor proceeds from a
tension between two terms in a metaphoric statement. Ricœur terms this tension a seman-
tic impertinence, which is a phenomenon of predication at the level of the whole state-
ment. The absurdity of a literal interpretation in the semantic context of the statement
leads to the destruction of the literal, and a transformation of this sudden contradiction
into a meaningful contradiction that makes sense. “Logical absurdity,” Ricœur explains,
create[s] a situation in which we have the choice between either preserving the literal sense of
both the subject and the modifier and concluding to the meaninglessness of the whole sen-
tence—or attributing a new meaning to the modifier such as the whole sentence makes sense
…When I say, “man is a fox” (the fox has chased the wolf), I must shift from a literal to a
metaphorical attribution if I want to save the sentence.47
A modern theory of metaphor shifts the role of resemblance from substituting the figura-
tive sense of a word by borrowing from the literal to the role of maintaining the tension
between odd predicates where the distance (and therefore absurdity) between the literal
interpretation is brought closer by the figurative interpretation. This has the effect of ren-
dering close what seems far resolved in the semantic dissonance between two seemingly
incompatible ideas.
Far from being ornamental, metaphor
consists rather in the reduction of the shock between two incompatible ideas, [and] it is in
this reduction of the shift, in this rapprochement, that we must look for the play of resem-
blance. What is at stake in a metaphorical statement is making a “kinship” appear where
ordinary vision perceives no mutual appropriateness at all.48
This semantic innovation displaces a theory of metaphor as substitution or naming, with a
theory of metaphor in tension between odd predicates:
In a theory of tension, which I am here opposing to a theory of substitution, a new significa-
tion emerges that deals with the whole statement. In this respect, metaphor is an instan-
taneous creation, a semantic innovation which has no status in established language and
which exists only in the attribution of unusual predicates. In this way, metaphor is closer
to the active resolution of an enigma than to simple association by resemblance. It is the res-
olution of a semantic dissonance.49
Substitution metaphors easily shift between literal and figurative meaning, but tension
metaphors create new meaning, precluding the restoration of the proper meaning of
the odd predicates. Ricœur concludes that the productive imagination plays a role in
the transition from literal incongruence to metaphoric congruence. Based on a semantic
theory of metaphor, “Imagination has to be linked to the role of likeness in the production
of a new meaning, a new sentential meaning, a new predicative meaning.”50
This modern semantic theory of metaphor leads Ricœur to a metaphoric concept of
truth, recognizing that the poetic function and the rhetorical function “cannot be fully dis-
tinguished until the conjunction between fiction and re-description is brought to light.”51
47Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics,” 102.
48Ricoeur, “Biblical Hermeneutics,” 78.
49Ibid., 79.
50Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 16:8.
51Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 291.
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The rhetorical function is the inverse of the poetic function; it only contributes ornamen-
tation to discourse, adding nothing new to the generation of meaning. Conversely, it is the
function of the poetic to seek and “re-describe reality by the roundabout route of heuristic
fiction.”52
This indirect route is undertaken by metaphor, which Ricœur describes as “that strategy
of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to
reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is set free.”53 Ricœur concludes that
a metaphoric concept of truth is inescapably paradoxical: “The paradox consists in the fact
there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the
critical incision of the (literal) ‘is not’ within the ontological vehemence of the (metapho-
rical) ‘is”.”54
As previously noted, the power and creativity of the productive imagination to iconi-
cally augment reality are housed in the dialectic between the verbal and the visual.
With a metaphoric use of language, verbal and visual are placed in a dialectical situation.
“It’s only when language is creative,” it will be recalled,
that imagination is creative… Imagination, then, should be treated as a dimension of
language. In that way, a new link would appear between imagination and metaphor. Here
is where we pass from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of imagination
about the text.55
Ricœur demonstrates this semantic model of the productive imagination by developing
the parallelisms between the models of the epistemological imagination and the metapho-
ric process of the poetic imagination. Each of the domains of the productive imagination
shares a capacity for suspension and the projection of new possibilities to re-describe the
world. For the social imagination, the concept of utopia is the Epochě that enables the pro-
jection of new possibilities. For the religious imagination, it is parabolization that suspends
ordinary reference, enabling the projection of new possibilities. Parabolization is the meta-
phorization of text by the religious productive imagination through intertextuality. Ricœur
explains:
We may now approach by itself the phenomenon of parabolization through intertextuality
that we have had to anticipate in order to account for the very dynamic of the narrative. I
shall now take the two expressions “parabolization” and “metaphorization” as synonyms,
it being understood that a metaphor can occur not only between words but between
whole sequences of sentences. The isotopies play a role at this discursive level comparable
to that of the semantic fields that enter into interaction in metaphor-sentences. Paraboliza-
tion is the metaphorization of discourse. In the case of the narrative-parables, it consists of
the metaphorization of a narrative taken as a whole. Intertextuality thus becomes an exten-
sion and consequently a particular interaction I have placed at the center of my theory of
metaphor.56
Undergirding this understanding of metaphoric truth is a conception of the productive
imagination’s capacity to re-imagine, that is augment, reality by critically and imagina-
tively inserting the literal is not within the ontological vehemence of the metaphorical
52Ibid., 291.
53Ibid., 247.
54Ibid., 302.
55Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics,” 110.
56Ricoeur, “The Bible and Imagination,” 161.
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is. Parabolization is the iconic moment of metaphor that stands outside every semantic
approach, transcending the text through the metaphoric transfer from text to life. The
incongruence of the metaphoric statement is resolved when the world in front of the
text is transformed from a proposed utopia to a probable world.
Ricœur identifies three movements in the metaphoric transfer from the work of the
imagination in the text to the world imagined in front of the text: thinking, seeing and
Epochě of sense. The first movement, thinking, produces new types of assimilations
between the nearness and farness of the metaphoric statement by “seeing” similarities.
The second movement, seeing, incorporates the pictorial element while avoiding a wea-
kened sensorial model of image. Seeing introduces the formula for the constructions of
icons controlled by semantics, which is “the way in which depiction occurs in predicative
assimilation: something appears on which we read the new connection.”57 The third move-
ment, Epochě of sense, creates an Epochě where the literal and descriptive sense and refer-
ence of language is suspended by themetaphorical sense and reference of the odd predicate.
Ricœur appropriates the term Epochě in the literary sense, as “the moment of negativity
brought by the image in the metaphoric process.”58 The negation Ricœur indicates as the
moment of negativity is not the place of the transcendental subject, as with Husserl, or the
parasitic image he has thus far denounced. Rather, it is the negation that “appears because
the image places the sense in the dimension of suspension, of Epochě, of fiction.”59 Epochě
returns Ricœur to a basic understanding of meaning in the relationship between sense and
reference in a metaphorical expression.
Application to Rastafari
The first movement in the metaphoric transfer from the work of the imagination in the
text to the world of imagination about the text—thinking—is illustrated by the reasoning
of Rastafari elder Mortimo Planno in the text, Rastafarian: The Earth’s Most Strangest
Man. Planno writes,
A Text is taken to draw a conclusion which can be counted upon as a test. I an I take up a
Bible and opened it. So I an I began in Genesis I. Question asked who spoke? Answer given
God spoke! Understand! Words are life!! I an I accept the word is God! Here. but where will
we go from here?60
The phrase, “Question asked who spoke? Answer given God spoke! Words are life!!” illus-
trates the imagination’s production of new types of assimilations between the nearness and
farness of the metaphoric statement by “seeing” similarities. In this case, Planno begins
with the act of reading, as he takes up a text. This act prompts the question, “Question
asked who spoke? Answer given God spoke! Words are life.” The words of the text are
read by Planno, but the question asked in the text is: “who spoke?” The proclamation
of the text is linked to the manifestation of creation: “God spoke!” in the declaration
“Words are life!! I an I accept the word is God.” Thinking “sees” the assimilation
between word as text, word as sound, and word as power.
57Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” 150.
58Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” 151.
59Ibid., 151.
60Planno, “The Earth’s Most Strangest Man,” 12.
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Planno does not stop here, but looks beyond the text to the second movement in the
metaphoric transfer from the work of the imagination in the text to the world of
imagination in front of the text, i.e. seeing — illustrated by the phrases “eye to see,”
“appear,” “look around,” and “I an I.” Planno declares, “God created all these beautiful
things, it appear that God had eyes to see so he looked around and said come let us
create man and man was created, both male and female. I an I accept that God is
the word the word made into flesh and God become a man and finish creation as a
man.”61 Ricœur identifies seeing as the schematization of iconic presentations,
arguing that:
By displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical distance, generates rap-
prochement. Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and through which
we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something but to
display relations in a depicting mode. Whether this depiction concerns unsaid and
unheard similarities or refers to qualities, structures, localizations, situations, attitudes, or
feelings, each time the new intended connection is grasped as what the icon describes or
depicts.62
The iconic presentation that is schematized is the concrete milieu of creation through
which Planno sees the similarities in God speaking creation and sharing in that creation
through the incarnation of the word made flesh. I an I is the odd predicate of the meta-
phoric statement that represents the transfer and divinization of the self through unity
with God.
This iconic representation, schematized as creation, recognizes the similarities between
the words speaking, seeing and creating. Planno’s assertion that “I an I accept that God is
the word the word made flesh and God become a man to finish creation as a man” is thus
an affirmation of a new type of assimilation between the nearness and farness of the meta-
phoric statement that sees similarities between God and humanity. Seeing similarities,
Ricœur argues,
is homogenous to discourse itself, which affects the logical discourse, the rapprochement
itself. The place of and role of the productive imagination is there in the insight, to which
Aristotle allude when he said that to make good metaphors is to contemplate likeness—the-
orein to omoion.63
The third movement in the metaphoric transfer from the work of the imagination in the
text to the world of imagination about the text (Epochě of sense) is illustrated by the use
of I-talk in Rastafari discourse. I-talk is a primary example of an odd predicate that Ras-
tafari use to re-imagine and re-create the world through language. The semantics of I-
talk sees the incarnation of the word as a split-reference, between the first person singu-
lar, the third person plural, and the incarnation of God, therefore signifying the divine
principle.64
I an I represents the unity between the individual “I” and the divine “I,” and through
this unity, the unity between two or more individuals expressed as I an I. I an I is used as a
61Planno, “The Earth’s Most Strangest Man,” 12.
62Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” 150.
63Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” 147.
64Edmonds, “Dread ‘I’ in-a-Babylon,” 23–35.
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subject even when it references an object “to indicate that all people are active, creative
agents and not passive objects.”65
The Rastafari term “citing-up” is a useful metaphoric statement that captures the
essence of Rastafari’s hermeneutic of word, sound and power. If one can get past
Murrell and Williams’s essentialization of Rastafari, their description is instructive:
Essentially, Rastas have adopted an Africa-centered and free-style reading of biblical
materials; but they are not united on matters of biblical interpretation, and except for the
practice of citing-up the Bible, they have not defined or developed a consistent methodology
for interpreting biblical texts. The art of citing-up places less emphasis on syntax, context,
and literary genre of the text and more on the speaker, the setting, and the scene.66
Murrell and Williams’s insistence on a consistent method blinds these exegetes to the
underlying hermeneutic implicit in Rastafari’s approach to the Bible. Despite this
short-coming, Murrell and Williams provide a good description of the reasoning of
citing-up:
Citing-up involves a combination of proof text, running oral and written commentaries (in
somewhat of a rabbinic style), associations of traditional myths and stories with contempor-
ary parallels, double-intentional (i.e., having double layers of meaning) symbols, and very
loose, free-style interpretations of biblical materials.67
Citing-up is what Ricœur identiﬁes as the phenomenon of parabolization through
intertextuality.
Metaphorically, citing refers to the citing of biblical narratives and to the sighting of the
metaphoric truth between the text and the context. Additionally, citing-up refers to the
reciting of the word of God in praise to Jah, and the sighting of Jah in the text and
context of the ritualized action of word, sound and power. Through citing-up, Rastafari
gain insights into their lived experience in exile and the promise held out in the recognition
of their divinization through the indwelling of Jah, Rastafari. Ras Planno summarizes this
profoundly suspicious hermeneutic as a faith that is “unbroken regardless of propaganda.”
He says,
the Bible was given finally, to our ancestors not before it was fully interpreted by Parson. But
faith show I an I that words used can expound truth. WORD is Power and Power is God. The
first Father in any Language I an I want to give to the world what is owed to them through the
Mercy of I an I God.68
Sighting-up/Seeing-as
An important vehicle that is consciously used to cite-up word, sound and power by Ras-
tafari elders, including Mortimo Planno, is Rastafari superstar Bob Marley.69 Bob Marley
65Edmonds, “Dread ‘I’ in-a-Babylon,” 33.
66Murrell and Williams, “The Black Biblical Hermeneutics of Rastafari,” 328.
67Ibid.
68Planno, “The Earth’s Most Strangest Man,” 2.
69A less successful attempt to proselytize was the 2012 conversion of hip hop artist Snoop Dog, whom Rastafarian Bunnie
Wailer identified as the reincarnation of Bob Marley. After initially seeming to adopt Rastafari by changing his name to
Snoop Lion and growing dreadlocks, Snoop Dog publically renounced Rastafari due to his self-reported weakness for
non-Ital food such as bacon. See “Rastafari Millennium Council Excommunicates Snoop Lion,” Jamaicansmusic.com.
http://www.jamaicansmusic.com/news/Music/Rastafari_Millennium_Council_Excommunicates_Snoop_Lion (accessed
May 30, 2016).
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was chosen by Planno and other elders to sight the truth that Babylon’s power gone down
as Zion stretches forth her hands. With the release of Burnin’ in late 1973, Marley assumed
the mantle of prophet sent forth from Jamaica, whose music, performances and persona
proclaimed his livity in Jah, Rastafari.70
Bob Marley is a poet whose lyrics and music, namely works, provide us with images of
life from the periphery, through his use of language. According to Ricœur, the images pro-
vided by the poet are creative works/techne that provide us with more than the existing
order of reality. “The decisive step in this phenomenology of the work,” Ricœur maintains,
is to say that the work is language and through language, the place where the lived act, con-
sciousness, can actually be language … This is a decisive step, because those who are unable
to write directly the phenomenology of the poet can write the phenomenology of the poem.
It’s the poet who gives us our image. All the examples that we try to draw from ourselves are
so poor. The ordinary psychology of the image—“I have an image of”—consists of giving us
an existing order. Creative fancies of images come from the poet. Because the poet has
brought them, we have the images as a reader. The gift of the image to the reader of the
poem is the center of the gift. A psychology of inspiration is always too poor. Instead, we
should place an emphasis on the poem as giving us the images in the sentence.71
The iconized images Bob Marley most often parabolizes are the images of Babylon and
Zion. Babylon and Zion infuse Marley and the Wailers’ lyrics and rhythms within individ-
ual songs and intertextuality between songs. Rastafari intellectual Dennis Forsythe paints
an iconic picture of Babylon, describing it as:
the first-person, gut-level experiences of alienation and frustration under slavery, colonialism
and their legacies. It is not an imposed concept, but one that has grown out of the gut feelings
and experiences of “souls on ice,” and of dismembered beings. Babylon is the psychic image
sustained by real life experiences, busted hopes, broken dreams, the blues of broken homes
and of disjointed tribes of people trapped by history. It is an image of fire and blood, of being
on the edge, in limbo, in the wilderness, in concrete jungles… It is a desolation in which man
feels disjointed and out of line with the plans of creation.72
This image of Babylon as radical evil is confronted and overcome through repatriation to
Ethiopia, reimagined in the image of Zion, the true home of Africans everywhere and the
heavenly kingdom.
Marley scholar Kwame Dawes notes that the inclusion of the Nyabinghi chants,
“Babylon Your Throne Gone Down” and “Fly Away Home to Zion” in the song ‘Rastaman
Chant’ on the 1973 album Burnin’ offered the world a clear sense of Marley and the
Wailers and the Rastafari faith, “a faith that would ultimately guide everything each
would do from that point on.”73 The pattern of the chants follows the pattern of Nyabinghi
drumming with the first part of the songs cite/sighting the vanquishing of radical evil rep-
resented by Babylon:
I hear the words of the rasta man say
Babylon your throne gone down, gone down
Babylon your throne gone down
70Livity is a combination of the words Live/Life with Divinity and denotes living in communion with Jah.
71Ricoeur, Imagination Lectures, 15: 16.
72In Edmonds, “Dread ‘I’ in-a-Babylon,” 24.
73Dawes, Bob Marley: Lyrical Genius, 76.
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Said, I hear the words of the higher man say
Babylon your throne gone down, gone down
Babylon your throne gone down
And I hear the angel with the seven seals
Babylon your throne’s gone down, gone down
Babylon your throne gone down
The chant does not end with the fall of Babylon, but continues chanting, hope proclaimed
in the promise of Zion.
I say fly away home to Zion, fly away home
I say fly away to Zion, fly away home
One bright morning when my work is over
Man will fly away home74
It is here where image confronts image, icon augments reality. Rastafari sees Ethiopia
stretch out her hands as the dew that descended upon the mountains of Zion: “for
there the Lord God, Jah, Rastafari has commanded the blessing, even life for evermore.”75
This pattern of the movement from Babylon to Zion is characteristic of both Marley’s
music and Rastafari theological reasoning. Rhythmically, Babylon is the heavy bass beat
characteristic of reggae and Zion is the light up twang of the Akete drum.76 The inclusion
of Nyabinghi drumming, the call and response pattern of the chant and the rhythmic
swaying of Bob, all indicate, as Dawes notes,that
The song is not a dance number, and it was not recorded to be played for revelers in the dance
clubs and parties. It is a sacred song and presented as such. Marley’s voice is that of the leader
—the chant director… It was a leadership that was musical but, more importantly, it was also
a spiritual leadership.77
Two songs that illustrate this spiritual leadership of parabolization are ‘Johnny Was’ from
the 1976 album, Rastaman Vibrations, and ‘No Woman, No Cry’ from the 1974 album,
Natty Dread. ‘Johnny Was’ is a lyrical illustration of a narrative-parable that cites-up
the violence of Babylon through a “son’s death being so stark as to be brutal.” The
story is that of a Jamaican ghetto rudie who is shot in the street, leaving his mum wonder-
ing where she went wrong. Marley sings:
Woman hold her head and cry,
’Cause her son had been shot down in the street and died
From a stray bullet.
74Marley, ‘Rastaman Chant’.
75Hales, InIology.
76Akete drums are used in Nyabinghi music. For further details see the following links: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akete
and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rc21fNvEPHk
77Dawes, Bob Marley: Lyrical Genius, 76. Marley’s prophetic potential was recognized and nurtured by his spiritual advisor,
Mortimo Planno. It was he who introduced Marley to the profoundly sacramental knowledge of “I an I” as the manifes-
tation of the indwelling of Jah, Rastafari, which Marley proclaimed throughout the world. Given Ricœur’s identification of
the biblical polyphony of names for God, this article concludes that Rastafari’s semantic innovation is not the naming of
God, but rather, the proclamation of “I an I” as “pieces of God”. See Rex Nettleford, “Discourse on Rastafarian Reality,” in
Chanting Down Babylon: The Rastafari Reader, 311–325 (315).
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Woman hold her head and cry;
Explaining to her was a passerby
Who saw the woman cry (cry)
Wondering how can she work it out,
Now she knows that the wages of sin is death, yeah!
Gift of Jah is life. (life)
She cried: Ah-um, I – I know!
“Johnny was a good man,” I – I know! (never did a thing wrong)
“Johnny was a good, good, good, good, good, good, good, good,
good, good, good man,” (Johnny was good man)
she cried – she crie-ie-ie-ie-ie-ie-ie-ied!78
Some commentators have interpreted the lyric, “Now she knows that the wages of sin is
death, yeah! / Gift of Jah is life. (life)” as a clear indication that Marley believed that had
Johnny been brought up Rastafari, none of this would have happened.79 Textually, Dawes
notes that the lyrical structure is more complicated, arguing that terms like “stray bullet”
and “shot by the system” indicate that it is Babylon and nothing else that is responsible for
the death and violence that were a daily occurrence in the streets of Kingston in the ’70s
and ’80s. By naming this death and violent Babylon together, Marley is drawing attention
to the injustice and suffering of life on the periphery, thereby changing perception of street
violence in the concrete jungle.
However one interprets it, the song concludes with Marley as the narrator “beside the
women”:
Wo-ooh! Woman hold her head and cry,
As her son had been shot down in the street and died
Just because of the system. (system)
Woman hold her head and cry;
Comforting her I was passing by.
She complained, then she cry:
Oh-ooh-wo-ah, cry (ah-ah), yeah, I know now (ah-ah),
no I know, I know now: (Johnny was a good man)
Said I know, mm-mm-mm-mm-mm. (Never did a thing wrong)
Ah! Ah! (Johnny was a good man)
Can a woman tender care, she cried, (Never did a thing wrong)
Cease towards the child she bear? (Johnny was a good man)
Wo-ho-ho-ooh! Woman cry, woman (Never did a thing wrong)
She cried, wo-oh! She cried, yeah! (Johnny was a good man)
Can a woman tender care
Cease towards the child she bear? (Never did a thing wrong)
Wo-now, cry! (Johnny was a good man)80
78Marley, ‘Johnny Was’.
79McCann and Hawke, Bob Marley, 74.
80Marley, ‘Johnny Was’.
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Once again at the women’s side, Marley tries to comfort her, and as she repeats “Johnny
was a good man”… “I know, I know, I know,” he joins her in the lamentation.
Dawes submits that the grace in the song lies not in condemnation of the individual, but
in Marley’s determination to humanize the men who were being killed each day on the
streets of Kingston.
The final lyrics, “Can a woman tender care / Cease towards the child she bear?” is a
direct allusion to Isaiah 49:15, “Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should
not have compassion on the son of her womb? yea, they may forget, yet will I not
forget thee.” Dawes concludes that with this proclamation, Marley
stands as a prophet looking at the hardships experienced by his people in Babylon, exempli-
fied by this moment in which the system destroys a man and prophecies that Jah will not
forget. The allusion complicates the song, turning it into a remarkable expression of faith
and hope in the midst of tragedy81
As a prophet,Marley affirms the dignity and innocence of those crushedbyBabylon. Johnny
does not die because of his personal sins, somemoral flaw or lack of faith in Jah, but is killed
by Babylon. This interpretation is intertextually supported by the 1978 song, ‘NoWoman,
No Cry’. In the first section of the song, Marley remembers life in Trenchtown, and the
“Good friends we have, oh, good friends we’ve lost / Along the way (way).” While not a
direct allusion to ‘Johnny Was’, it is an invocation of good friends lost, and comforting a
crying woman brings to mind the narrative-parable of ‘Johnny Was’.
Said said
Said I remember when we used to sit
In the government yard in Trenchtown
Oba, ob-serving the hypocrites
As they would mingle with the good people we meet
Good friends we have had, oh good friends we’ve lost along the way
In this bright future you can’t forget your past
So dry your tears I say
No woman, no cry
No woman, no cry
Oh my Little sister, don’t shed no tears
No woman, no cry
Said, said, said I remember when we used to sit
In the government yard in Trenchtown
And then Georgie would make the fire light
Log wood burnin’ through the night
Then we would cook corn meal porridge
Of which I’ll share with you.82
Between the two narrations of memories, one of friends lost, the other of the comradery of
sharing a simple meal, is the title refrain, “No woman, no cry.” Although written “No cry,”
81Dawes, Bob Marley: Lyrical Genius, 163–64.
82Marley, ‘No Woman, No Cry’.
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the audio of Marley singing this lyric is closer to the Jamaican patois word “Nuh,” the
meaning of which is closer to “don’t,” as in, “don’t cry.”83
The repetition of the chorus is similar to the lamentation shared by Marley in the nar-
rative-parable ‘Johnny Was’. Heard side by side, it is not too difficult to imagine the nar-
rator in ‘Johnny Was’ comforting the women with the refrain, “No woman, no cry.”
After warning against forgetting this past, the song moves into the great future, as the
tempo speeds up to match the lyrics.
My fear is my only courage
So I’ve got to push on thru
Oh, while I’m gone
Everything’s gonna be alright, everything’s gonna be alright
Everything’s gonna be alright, everything’s gonna be alright
Everything’s gonna be alright, everything’s gonna be alright
Everything’s gonna be alright, everything’s gonna be alright
So woman no cry, no, no woman no cry.84
With the repetition, “Everything’s gonna be alright,” Marley proclaims hope that despite
(or rather, in spite of) the suffering and lamentation of friends lost, wailed in ‘JohnnyWas’,
everything is going to be alright as we push on through Babylon on to Zion. This hope in
Zion despite suffering in Babylon is expressed through faith in the righteousness of Jah,
Rastafari, grounded in the chant, “Babylon, Your Throne Gone Down, Fly Away Home.”
As a prophet of Rastafari, Marley’s music and lyrics exemplify a consistent hermeneutic
method of parabolization through word, sound and power. By citing-up the historical,
social, political and economic context of slavery, colonialism, racism and oppression as
seen through the lens of biblical text, in dialogue with the narrative and images of
extra-biblical texts,85 Marley chants down the evil of Babylon, while casting our gaze to
hope in Zion. The movement between the figurative and the literal, past and current, per-
sonalities and events in scripture, and personalities and events in the world today, are all
inventions of the concept of metaphoric truth, a truth that Ricœur concludes is inescap-
ably paradoxical. This paradox, Ricœur maintains, “consists in the fact there is no other
way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth other than to include the critical
incision of the (literal) ‘is not’ (Johnny was…) within the ontological vehemence of the
(metaphorical) ‘is’ (Johnny is a good man).”86 Marley’s music, so conceptually framed
by the religious productive imagination, iconically augments the reality of the radical
evil of Babylon by projecting an even more radical hope in Zion. By enlarging our herme-
neutic horizon, our gaze shifts beyond the ordinary, and for some, suspect canons of
sacred texts. The veil is removed for those who have eyes to see, allowing us to see the
canon within the canon which is the truth, the word made flesh, written on the other
half of the heart.87
83In Jamaican Patois, the word “no” (or “nuh”) when used in a specific context means “don’t”; hence the English translation
of “No woman, no cry” would be “No woman, don’t cry.” In the song, Bob Marley is telling the woman not to cry because
everything is going to be alright.
84Marley, ‘No Women, No Cry’.
85See Southard, “Modern Ethiopia,” 679–738.
86Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, 302.
87Murrell and Williams, “The Black Biblical Hermeneutics of Rastafari,” 328.
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